A Nation of Deadbeats: An Uncommon History of America's Financial Disasters

The major strength of Nelson's (Leslie and Naomi Legum Professor of History, Coll. of William and Mary; Steel Drivin' Man: John Henry, the Untold Story of an American Legend) latest work is in showing that the 2007–09 recession is not unique. Throughout U.S. history, murky monetary ties and unwarranted financial risks have periodically, almost predictably, incited panics and doomed investors. The recent Great Recession is only one of many crises Nelson documents, covering from 1792 to 1929. What seems to change each time is the underlying commodity appraised and (over)valued—land, cotton, even plantation and slave prices. What stays constant is the ensuing doubt over valuations, fear, sell-off, panic, and political and economic repercussions. The author explains the monetary links in sometimes painstaking detail, but this proves his point all the more: the very fact that links are numerous and opaque ultimately leads to the lender's inability to correctly assess risk, which in turn leads to speculative bubbles in various commodities.